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Social discounting in economics involves applying a diminishing weight to community-wide benefits or
costs into the future. It impacts on public policy decisions involving future positive or negative effects,
but there is no consensus on the correct basis for determining the social discount rate. This study presents
an evolutionary biological framework for social discounting. How an organism should value future
benefits to its local community is governed by the extent to which members of the community in the
future are likely to be its kin. Trade-offs between immediate and delayed benefits to an individual or
to its community are analysed for a modelled patch-structured iteroparous population with limited dis-
persal. It is shown that the social discount rate is generally lower than the individual (private) discount
rate. The difference in the two rates is most pronounced, in ratio terms, when the dispersal level is low
and the hazard rate for patch destruction is much smaller than the individual mortality rate. When
decisions involve enforced collective action rather than individuals acting independently, social invest-
ment increases but the social discount rate remains the same.
Keywords: discounting; discount rate; social discounting; altruism; kin selection; dispersal1. INTRODUCTION
Individual and collective decisions taken today may result
in future community-wide costs or benefits, and in extreme
cases may affect community survival (Diamond 2005).
How should such future effects be valued against costs or
benefits today? A social investment today may yield a
stream of future benefits. Choosing between such an
investment and an alternative action that yields only
immediate benefits is a difficult problem. It is normal in
such public policy dilemmas to discount future social
benefits (Goulder & Stavins 2002), with the effect that a
potentially indefinite social benefit stream is given a finite
present value. The choice of the social discount rate has
a bearing on public policy decisions involving costs and
benefits at different times (Dasgupta & Heal 1974;
Gupta et al. 1996; Atherton & French 1998; Pearce et al.
2003). A lower social discount rate tends to favour more
environmental protection and restoration (Gupta et al.
1996). Conversely, more rapid discounting implies more
rapid consumption of both non-renewable and renewable
resources and can lead to extinction of the latter (Clark
1973; Dasgupta & Heal 1974).
What is the rationale for allocating progressively lower
weights to benefits from social investments further into
the future? One possible reason is the risk of a future
event that will bring to an end the social benefit stream
arising from the investment. This could take the form of
a catastrophe that wipes out the community in which
the investment is located (Dasgupta & Heal 1979), or
simply a development that renders a social investmentu@lse.ac.uk
ic supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.
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28 April 2009 2955redundant or causes it to stop working (Rambaud &
Torrecillas 2005). In addition to such risk, however,
there is another consideration: how should a risk-free wel-
fare gain or loss by members of the community at some
point in the future be valued against a risk-free welfare
gain or loss by members of the community today? Some
authors regard it as axiomatic, for moral reasons, that
the welfare of all people, present and future, should be
accorded the same weight in public policy decisions
(Broome 1994). However, decisions can be expected to
take account of the welfare of future people only to the
extent that decision makers care about future people
(Marglin 1963). A simple population analysis indicates
that, as long as present-day decision makers give some
positive weight to the welfare of future members of
the community, the social discount rate will be lower
than the private discount rate for individual benefits
(Sumaila & Walters 2005). But this leaves open the
question of exactly what weighting should be used.
The present study considers social discounting as a
general problem in evolutionary biology, applicable to
organisms that live in viscous populations with limited
dispersal. It is concerned with the following question:
what social discount rate would result from natural selec-
tion? This raises a more basic question: why should an
organism, governed by its selfish genes, care about the
future welfare of its community? A possible answer
comes from the biological theory of kin selection: if wel-
fare gains translate to improved survival or reproductive
success, then, other things being equal, selection will
tend to favour behaviours that result in welfare gains to
relatives. If, additionally, geographical proximity is
associated with a positive level of relatedness (Hamilton
1975; Manica et al. 2005), and there is some degree of
long-term persistence to this association, evolution mayThis journal is q 2009 The Royal Society
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members of its community or locality in future as
there will be a statistical tendency for the recipients of
such benefits to be her/his kin. This can be understood
by reference to the principle that altruism can evolve
where there is some form of assortment within the popu-
lation so that altruists are more likely to be recipients of
altruistic benefits than are non-altruists (Fletcher &
Doebeli 2009). Lehmann (2007) has shown that, in a
patch-structured semelparous population with discrete
generations, this effect can lead to selection for altruistic
acts whose effects last for several generations. The present
study takes this approach further by deriving explicit time
preferences for both individual and social benefits, for
an iteroparous patch-structured population facing
trade-offs in continuous time. It establishes that natural
selection will favour two distinct discount rates, with
the individual discount rate generally being higher than the
social discount rate.
This analysis of social discounting arising from the
inclusive fitness value to an organism of delayed benefits
to its community contrasts with the idea that individual
discounting is mediated by the capacity to make transfers
to specific relatives (Barro 1974; Rogers 1994). General
transfers within a kin group have been modelled for situ-
ations in which any conflict of interest between donor and
recipient is ignored (Hansson & Stuart 1990; Kaplan &
Robson 2002; Lee 2003; Robson & Kalpan 2003) which
is equivalent to a donor treating recipients as full kin with
a relatedness of one (Rogers 2003), and for situations in
which the level and pattern of transfers is exogenously
determined (Lee 2008). The present study, however, is
concerned with trade-offs involving immediate or delayed
benefits to self or local community; the decay over time
of expected relatedness to an organism of members of its
local community is critical to the analysis.2. POPULATION MODEL
Consider an infinite population occupying discrete
patches, each patch containing a fixed number N of indi-
viduals. The population is asexual (a sexual population is
considered in the electronic supplementary material). It is
governed by a Moran-type dynamic process with individ-
uals and entire patches subject to random replacement
events, whereby an individual or patch is duplicated and
replaces (i.e. kills) another individual or patch, as follows:
Individual reproduction and mortality event: an individual
is duplicated; with probability v, the duplicate disperses to
a different patch, chosen at random, and kills and replaces
a random member of that patch, and with probability
(12v), the duplicate kills and replaces a member of its
own patch, chosen at random from the N members
including its parent.
Patch colonization and destruction event: an entire patch
is duplicated and replaces one of the other patches,
chosen at random.
At equilibrium, each member of the population has an
individual reproductive rate (probability per unit time for
individual reproduction) of k. The individual mortality
rate from the risk of being replaced in such an event is
also k. Each patch has a colonization rate (probability
per unit time for being duplicated and taking over another
patch) of v. The rate for a patch to be wiped out in aProc. R. Soc. B (2009)destruction event, i.e. colonized by another patch, is
also v.
(a) Survival functions
An organism’s probability si(t) of surviving a delay t with-
out being killed through either individual mortality or
destruction of its patch is
siðtÞ ¼ expððvþ kÞtÞ: ð2:1Þ
The probability sp(t) of a patch surviving a delay t
without suffering a patch-level destruction event is
spðtÞ ¼ expðvtÞ: ð2:2Þ(b) Relatedness
For this asexual population, the relatedness of two indi-
viduals is the probability that they are identical. R is the
relatedness at equilibrium of an individual to all members
of its patch including itself. ROTH is the relatedness of an
individual to an individual in its patch other than itself.
The two measures are related by
R ¼ ð1=NÞ þ ROTHðN  1Þ=N
or
ROTH ¼ ðNR 1Þ=ðN  1Þ: ð2:3Þ
Consider a newborn in an equilibrium population. Its
relatedness to a randomly chosen comparison member of
its patch is ROTH. But this relatedness can also be calcu-
lated as follows: with probability v, the newborn’s parent
is from another patch and its relatedness to the compari-
son member is zero. With probability (12v), the
newborn’s parent is from the same patch; if so, then
with probability 1/N the comparison member is the
parent and the newborn’s relatedness to the compa-
rison member is 1, and with probability (121/N), the
comparison member is not the parent and the newborn’s
relatedness to the comparison member is ROTH. This
yields the recurrence relationship
ROTH ¼ ð1 vÞ½1=N þ ROTHð1 1=NÞ: ð2:4Þ
Substituting into equation (2.4) from equation (2.3)
and simplifying gives
R ¼ 1=ðvN þ 1 vÞ: ð2:5Þ3. PREFERENCES
I assume that each organism sporadically faces choices
over options involving small immediate or delayed
benefits to itself or to its patch. The analysis below deter-
mines the preferences that are favoured by natural
selection, i.e. the preferences that maximize inclusive
fitness. As the total population does not grow, this should
be understood as maximizing relative inclusive fitness.
Consider preferences from the point of view of a single
organism, denoted as the focal organism. I assume that the
focal organism’s inclusive fitness gain from a small benefit
is proportional to the benefit level, and that multiple
benefits have an additive effect on inclusive fitness. The
problem faced by the focal organism can be conceptual-
ized as a (multidimensional) trade-off over the various
xy optimum choice
Figure 1. A hypothetical trade-off between two benefits. For
a given level of any one of the two benefits, the focal organ-
ism would prefer more of the other. However, its choices are
constrained to lie along the trade-off curve so that it cannot
gain more of one without getting less of the other. If a unit
increase in x has the same effect on fitness as an increase
of two units in y, then fitness is maximized by maximizing
(x + 2y). At the optimum choice, the tangent to the trade-
off curve has a slope of 22.
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Figure 2. The curve shows relative value against delay for a
given benefit. An immediate benefit is taken to have a relative
value of 1. The instantaneous time-preference rate u is deter-
mined by the steepness of the curve at a delay of zero. The
dotted line is a tangent to the curve at a delay of zero and
has a gradient of 2u.
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other benefits constant (figure 1). The levels of the two
benefits are denoted by x and y. At a given value of x
the focal organism would prefer a larger value of y, and
at a given value of y it would prefer a larger value of x.
Its choices, however, are constrained to lie along the
trade-off curve, so that it cannot get more of one benefit
without less of the other.
Preferences, defined by rates of substitution between
alternative benefits, are determined by the ratio of mar-
ginal increments to inclusive fitness for the focal organism
from each benefit. Figure 1 illustrates a situation in which
a unit increase in x has the same effect on inclusive fitness
as an increase of two units in y. Inclusive fitness is
maximized by maximizing the value of (x þ 2y). At the
optimum choice, the tangent to the trade-off curve has
a slope of 22.
(a) Discounting
Discounting depends on how the gain to inclusive fitness
from some benefit due after a delay declines as a function
of delay (Sozou 1998), with the instantaneous time-
preference rate (Rogers 1994; Sozou & Seymour 2003)
u given by the proportional rate of decline of inclusive fit-
ness value with delay (figure 2). For what follows, uIND is
the individual discount rate, i.e. the time-preference rate
for a benefit to the focal organism itself. Immediate and
delayed benefits to a patch can arise from patch members
acting either independently or through enforced joint action
arising from the focal organism’s independent action.
The social discount rate uSOC is the time-preference rate
for benefits to the focal organism’s patch. The group
social discount rate uSOC,GROUP is the time-preference
rate for a benefit to the focal organism’s patch arising
from a collective action that is enforced among all
members of the patch.Proc. R. Soc. B (2009)4. ANALYSIS
To derive inclusive fitness-maximizing preferences,
including individual and social discount rates, it is necess-
ary to calculate the inclusive fitness consequences of
different possible benefits, either to the focal organism
or to its patch, for immediate or delayed benefits. The
effect of a particular benefit on the inclusive fitness of
the focal organism is given by the expected increase in
the number of copies of the focal organism in the popu-
lation arising from the benefit, as described in Taylor
(1992). A given benefit is described by three parameters:
the type of benefit, its magnitude, and the delay before
the benefit is due. The expected inclusive fitness gain
for the focal organism is written as w(type of benefit,
size of benefit, delay). Three types of benefit are con-
sidered: a reproductive benefit to the focal organism
itself, denoted by repSELF; a reproductive benefit to a
random member of the focal organism’s patch, denoted
by repPATCH; and a colonization benefit to the focal
organism’s patch, denoted by colPATCH.
(a) Immediate reproductive benefit to self
Consider a small amount a of immediate reproduction
realized immediately by the focal organism. This can be
constructed as a temporary increase of magnitude Dk and
duration dt in its reproduction rate, withDk dt ¼ a. It results
in a probability a that the organism will produce an
additional offspring; if this additional offspring is produced,
thenwith probability v this offspringwill disperse to another
patch, and with probability (12v) it will stay on the home
patch, displacing another individual of expected relatedness
R. The expected inclusive fitness gain is
wðrepSELF; a; 0Þ ¼ a½vþ ð1 RÞð1 vÞ ¼ að1 Rþ RvÞ:
ð4:1Þ
(b) Immediate reproductive benefit to patch
(random beneficiary)
Now consider a small amount b of additional reproduc-
tion, realized immediately by a member of the focal
organism’s patch chosen randomly from all members
including itself. Thus, a recipient of expected relatedness
2958 P. D. Sozou Individual and social discounting
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an extra offspring. With probability v, this offspring
disperses to another patch, giving an inclusive fitness
gain R to the focal organism; with probability (12v),
this offspring remains on the patch, displacing another
individual of relatedness R to the focal organism and
therefore giving an inclusive fitness gain of zero. The
expected marginal effect on inclusive fitness is
wðrepPATCH; b; 0Þ ¼ bRv: ð4:2Þ
(c) Preference with respect to immediate
benefits
The focal organism’s inclusive fitness benefit from a gain
b to reproduction in its patch will be greater than from a
gain a to its own reproduction if w(repPATCH, b, 0) .
w(repSELF, a, 0). Substituting from equations (2.5),
(4.1) and (4.2), this simplifies to
b=N . a: ð4:3Þ
Note that b/N is the focal organism’s expected increase
in reproduction arising from a 1/N share of a benefit b to its
patch. Thus, the net effect on the focal’s inclusive fitness is
fully captured by the change to its own net reproductive
rate; the net inclusive fitness effect of changes in the repro-
ductive output of other members of its patch is zero. It
follows that, in this model, the focal organism should not
be willing to sacrifice some of its own reproduction to
either increase or reduce the reproductive output rate of
other members of its patch, as has been shown for a semel-
parous infinite patch-structured population (Taylor 1992)
and for semelparous (Rousset 2004) and iteroparous
(Taylor et al. 2007) populations on finite networks (and it
has been shown (Lehmann et al. 2007) that a number of
evolutionary graph theory models can be understood
through classic inclusive fitness theory). This is a conse-
quence of local competition counteracting local kinship
(Grafen 1984; Wilson et al. 1992).
(d) Immediate colonization benefit to patch
Consider a small amount c of additional colonization rea-
lized immediately by the focal organism’s patch. This
gives a probability c that the patch will enjoy an additional
colonization event resulting in a fitness gain NR to the
focal organism. Hence the expected fitness gain is
wðcolPATCH; c; 0Þ ¼ cNR: ð4:4Þ(e) Delayed reproductive benefit to self
Consider a small amount a of additional reproduction by
the focal organism, to be realized after a delay t con-
ditional on the focal organism still being alive after the
delay (Sozou & Seymour 2003). As long as the focal
organism remains alive, its relatedness to other members
of the patch remains R. From the reference frame of the
present, the reward results in a probability asi(t) that
the focal organism will produce an additional offspring,
which will disperse with probability v, and with prob-
ability (12v) will stay on the patch and displace another
individual of expected relatedness R. The expected fitness
gain is
wðrepSELF; a; tÞ ¼ asiðtÞ½vþ ð1 RÞð1 vÞ: ð4:5Þ
Proc. R. Soc. B (2009)(f) The individual discount rate
Equations (4.1) and (4.5) give
wðrepSELF; a; tÞ ¼ siðtÞwðrepSELF; a; 0Þ: ð4:6Þ
The individual discount rate uIND is given by
uIND ¼ lim
dt!0
wðrepSELF; a; 0Þ  wðrepSELF; a;dtÞ
wðrepSELF; a; 0Þ  dt
 
¼  _wðrepSELF; a; 0Þ
wðrepSELF; a; 0Þ
:
Substituting from equations (2.1) and (4.6) yields
uIND ¼ vþ k: ð4:7Þ
Hence, the individual discount rate is given by the sum
of the patch destruction rate and the individual mortality
and so equals the total death rate experienced by the
organism.
(g) Decay of relatedness into the future
As long as the focal organism remains alive, its mean
relatedness to members of its patch remains at the value
R given in equation (2.5). A new member in its patch
could be: its own offspring, which will increase its mean
relatedness to members of its patch; or the offspring of
another member of its patch, which will leave expected
relatedness unchanged; or an arrival from another
patch, which will decrease its mean relatedness to mem-
bers of its patch. The tendency for the first process to
increase relatedness is balanced by the tendency for the
third to decrease it. But if the focal organism dies, the
first process ends and so relatedness to it of members of
the patch will tend to decrease over time. It follows that
if relatedness is calculated from a perspective that is not
conditional on the focal organism remaining alive, it will
decline over time.
Let RE(t) be the expected relatedness of other mem-
bers of the patch to the focal organism as a function of
delay, conditional on the patch not having suffered cata-
strophic destruction during the delay but not conditional
on the focal organism remaining alive. The individual
mortality rate is k. A mortality event causes a patch
member of expected relatedness RE to the focal organism
to be replaced by an immigrant of relatedness 0 with
probability v, and by an existing patch member of
expected relatedness RE with probability (12v). Hence
dRE
dt
¼ kvRE:
And RE(0) =R. This gives
REðtÞ ¼ R expðkvtÞ: ð4:8Þ
Now consider a measure of relatedness of the focal
organism to a random member of its patch in the future
that allows for both the possibility that the focal organism
will have died during the delay and the possibility that the
patch will have suffered a colonization event during the
delay. This is the unconditional relatedness denoted by
RU(t). With probability sp(t), the patch will not suffer
destruction during the delay and the relatedness at delay
t will be RE(t). With probability (12sp(t)), the patch
will suffer destruction and the focal organism’s related-
ness to a random member at delay t will be zero. RU(t)
Individual and social discounting P. D. Sozou 2959
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RUðtÞ ¼ REðtÞspðtÞ: ð4:9Þ
Substituting from equations (2.2) and (4.8) gives
RUðtÞ ¼ R expððvþ kvÞtÞ: ð4:10Þ
(h) Delayed reproductive benefit to patch
(random beneficiary)
Consider an amount b of additional reproduction, to be
realized by a member of the focal organism’s patch
chosen randomly after a delay t. It will be nominally
assumed that realization of the benefit is conditional on
the patch not having suffered a destruction event during
the delay, but this assumption is not necessary for the
analysis. This delayed benefit gives a probability bsp(t)
that a patch member of expected relatedness RE(t) to
the focal organism produces an additional offspring;
with probability v this offspring disperses, giving a fitness
gain of RE(t) to the focal organism, and with probability
(12v) this offspring remains on the patch giving a fitness
gain of zero. The expected fitness gain is
wðrepPATCH; b; tÞ ¼ bspðtÞvREðtÞ:
From equation (4.9), this may be expressed as
wðrepPATCH; b; tÞ ¼ bvRUðtÞ: ð4:11Þ
(i) Delayed colonization benefit to patch
Consider a small amount c of additional colonization by
the focal organism’s patch, realized after a delay t, con-
ditional on the patch not having suffered a destruction
event during the delay. This gives a probability csp(t)
that the patch will enjoy an additional colonization
event resulting in a fitness gain NRE(t) to the focal
organism. The expected fitness gain is
wðcolPATCH; c; tÞ ¼ cNREðtÞspðtÞ ¼ cNRUðtÞ: ð4:12Þ
(j) The social discount rate
The social discount rate uSOC is the proportional rate of
decline with delay of the fitness value to the focal organ-
ism of a benefit to its patch. There are two possible
forms of benefit to the patch, delayed reproduction and
delayed colonization. From equations (4.10), (4.11) and
(4.12), they yield the same social discount rate:
uSOC ¼  _wðrepPATCH; b; 0Þ
wðrepPATCH; b; 0Þ
¼  _wðcolPATCH; c; 0Þ
wðcolPATCH; c; 0Þ
¼ 
_RUð0Þ
RUð0Þ ¼ vþ kv: ð4:13Þ
The social discount rate is thus given by the patch
destruction rate v plus the product of the individual mor-
tality rate k and the dispersal level v. It is equal to the rate
constant in RU(t), governing the rate of decline of uncon-
ditional expected relatedness of the focal organism to a
random member of the patch. If v = 1, i.e. all newborns
disperse to a new patch, then uSOC = uIND (see equation
(4.7)). If v = 0, i.e. there is no dispersal, then uSOC = v.
For the general case of 0, v , 1, v, uSOC , uIND. If
v  1 and v  k, i.e. the dispersal level is low and the
Proc. R. Soc. B (2009)patch destruction rate is much lower than the individual
mortality rate, then uSOC  uIND.
(k) The effect of enforced collective social action
The analysis so far has considered an organism’s choices
when these are independent of the actions of other mem-
bers of its patch. However, social behaviour may instead
be enforced (Frank 1995); in a modern human society,
for example, this may take the form of prohibition of
anti-social activities such as improperly dumping waste.
Let wGROUP be the fitness gain to the focal organism
from an action that is adopted by all members of the
patch and enforced. I assume that the focal organism
has, probabilistically at least, some influence over the
choice of action, so that natural selection acts on its pre-
ferences for this action. Consider first a collective action
resulting in each member of the patch enjoying an
immediate individual reproductive benefit a. The fitness
gain for the focal organism arises from the proportion v
of this increased reproduction, from N patch members
of relatedness R to the focal organism, which disperses:
wGROUPðrepSELF; a; 0Þ ¼ aNRv: ð4:14Þ
Consider now a collective action such that each
member of the patch generates immediate additional
reproduction b by a random member of the patch.
Again, the net fitness gain for the focal organism arises
from the proportion of increased reproduction that dis-
perses and is given by
wGROUPðrepPATCH; b; 0Þ ¼ bNRv: ð4:15Þ
Comparing equations (4.14) and (4.15), the focal
organism’s fitness gain from a collective and enforced
decision is greater if each patch member’s actions contrib-
ute b to a random member than if each member’s actions
contribute a to its own reproduction if b . a. This is more
easily satisfied than equation (4.3), i.e. behaviour will
tend to shift in the direction of acts that benefit the
patch rather than the individual.
Now consider a collective and enforced decision such
that each patch member’s action contributes a reproduc-
tive benefit b to a random member of the patch after a
delay t, realization of this being conditional on the
patch not suffering destruction during the delay. This
gives a probability sp(t) of a total reproductive benefit
Nb to recipients of expected relatedness RE(t) to the
focal organism. The expected fitness gain for the focal
organism arises from the proportion v of this additional
reproduction that disperses outside the patch. This is
equal to Nb RE(t)sp(t). From equation (4.9), this may
be written as
wGROUPðrepPATCH; b; tÞ ¼ bNRUðtÞv: ð4:16Þ
Now consider a joint decision in which the action of
each member of the patch contributes a colonization
benefit c to the patch after a delay t, realization of the
benefit being conditional on the patch not suffering
destruction during the delay. This gives a probability
Ncsp(t) of an additional colonization event; if such an
event occurs, it has fitness value NRE(t) to the focal
organism. The focal organism’s expected fitness gain
from the delayed additional colonization benefit enforced
among all members of the patch is therefore cN2RE(t)sp(t).
2960 P. D. Sozou Individual and social discounting
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wGROUPðcolPATCH; ctÞ ¼ cN2RUðtÞ: ð4:17Þ
The social discount rate for a patch benefit arising
from an enforced common decision, affecting delayed
reproduction or delayed colonization, is from equations
(4.10), (4.16) and (4.17) given by
uSOC;GROUP ¼  _wGROUPðrepPATCH; b; 0Þ
wGROUPðrepPATCH; b; 0Þ
¼  _wGROUPðcolPATCH; c; 0Þ
wGROUPðcolPATCH; c; 0Þ
¼ 
_RUð0Þ
RUð0Þ ¼ kvþ v: ð4:18Þ
Comparing equation (4.18) to equation (4.13), the social
discount rate under joint decision making with enforced
social investment is the same as under voluntary action.5. DISCUSSION
Lehmann (2007) showed that it may be adaptive for an
organism to act in a way that produces future benefits to
its community, if there is a statistical tendency for future
members of its community to be its kin. The present
study develops this insight further by evaluating how an
organism should value future benefits to itself or to its
community. This leads to the determination of two separ-
ate discount rates. The individual (private) discount rate
applies to delayed benefits to the organism itself; the con-
cept of an individual discount rate has been applied in
evolutionary biology at least as far back as Fisher (1930).
The social discount rate applies to delayed benefits to the
organism’s community; this is a familiar concept in
economics and philosophy (in relation to human commu-
nities) (e.g. Marglin 1963; Broome 1994), but has not
hitherto been considered explicitly in evolutionary biology.
This study shows how the social discount rate is relevant
to understanding how an organism should choose bet-
ween actions resulting in different costs or benefits to its
community at different times.
Individual and social discount rates are calculated for a
simple modelled asexual population of organisms in
discrete patches with limited dispersal, subject to both indi-
vidual mortality and patch destruction random events. The
individual discount rate (expression 4.7) is equal to the
sum of an organism’s hazard rate for its patch to be
destroyed and the hazard rate for it to suffer an individual
mortality event, and is therefore equal to its overall death
rate. The social discount rate is governed by the decay of
expected relatedness to the focal organism of a member
of its community chosen at random at some future time
(expression 4.10), and is equal to the organism’s hazard
rate for its patch to be destroyed plus the product of the
hazard rate for it to suffer an individual mortality event
and the dispersal level (expression 4.13). The social
discount rate is lower than the individual discount rate,
except in the case of no population viscosity—i.e. a disper-
sal level of 100 per cent—when the two discount rates are
the same. If patches are long-lived relative to individual life
expectancy (Sherwood 2007), and the dispersal level is low,
the social discount rate will be much lower than the
individual discount rate in ratio terms.Proc. R. Soc. B (2009)The electronic supplementary material shows that the
derived results apply exactly to a sexual population, as
long as there are no sex differences in birth and death
rates and the sex ratio is maintained at exactly 1 : 1 in
each patch. If the sex ratio in a patch can drift away
from 1 : 1, the results no longer apply exactly, but they
will be an increasingly good approximation to optimal
behaviour as patch size increases.
There is no direct dependence of the social discount rate
on the number of individuals N in each patch. This may
seem counterintuitive. For the present model, the dispersal
level v and patch destruction rate v are taken as given, i.e.
they are treated as exogenously specified parameters of the
model. It would not be unreasonable to assume, however,
that a larger patch size may be associated with a lower
level of dispersal or a lower patch destruction rate; explicitly
putting such a relationship into the model would lead to a
lower social discount rate with increasing patch size. This
consideration would be important in a model that con-
sidered a population comprising patches of different sizes,
but is beyond the scope of the present model.
A change from independent individual action to
enforced collective action does not change the social
discount rate (compare expressions 4.13 and 4.18). This
may again seem counterintuitive: enforced collective
action will tend to result in a shift towards more socially
beneficial action (Hardin 1968). The social discount rate,
however, is determined by the relative gain from delayed
social benefits as compared with immediate social benefits.
Enforced collective action will tend to increase social
investment for both immediate and delayed community-
wide gains, but the relative gain from a delayed benefit as
compared with an immediate benefit remains the same.
A key assumption in this framework is that the delayed
social benefits being considered are benefits to a local
community. The meaning of ‘local’ is somewhat flexible
with respect to general application of the theory. What
matters is that there is some relevant sense in which a
delayed benefit helps locals in preference to non-locals:
evolution is ultimately driven by competition.
Preferences that imply positive valuation of future social
benefits, asmodelled here, are likely to be found in biological
systems comprising long-lived groups within which there is a
non-negligible level of relatedness. For example, a pathogen’s
success in spreading through a population of host organisms
may depend in part on how the pathogen influences the
future condition of a host it has infected (Frank 1992;
Nowak &May 1994; Gandon et al. 2002). If the importance
to the pathogen’s success of this influence diminishes with
delay, and this is reflected in the pathogen’s strategy, then
the pathogen may be said to exhibit social discounting.
To what extent is this analysis relevant to understand-
ing social discounting in people? There are several
considerations that may limit the direct application of
these results to humans. In particular, the model assumes
a simple population structure; the population is assumed
to be homogeneous with respect to both individuals and
patches; there is no scope for local population growth or
decline; and individuals do not age. But insofar as
humans have tended to live in long-lived groups or
localities in which local kinship endures over time scales
longer than the human lifespan, it seems plausible that
some sort of future-valuing social preferences of the
form considered here may have been selected in humans.
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on the whole population, rather than a locality or specific
group? This question arises, for example, in the problem
of global climate change. In the absence of competition
between planets, there is no basis for behaviours that
benefit the planet as a whole to be directly adaptive,
and therefore no evolutionary basis for directly determin-
ing a social discount rate for global welfare. This seems to
lead to a puzzle: why do people care at all about the long-
term welfare of humanity as a whole? People may have
evolved preferences for positive valuation of long-term
general social welfare in ancestral environments in which
such preferences would have mainly or always influenced
actions with only local effects, and that therefore would
have helped kin. But in the modern, global environment,
such preferences may cause people to care about global
problems such as climate change.6. CONCLUSIONS
This study has derived analytical results for the individual
and social discount rates that would arise through natural
selection in a patch-structured iteroparous population
with limited dispersal. The modelled population is not
intended to be a realistic representation of any specific
organism. Rather, it provides a simple framework
allowing analytical results for the fitness consequences
of different behaviours to be derived. These results yield
insights into how individual mortality, community
destruction and dispersal influence individual and social
discount rates. In real organisms, individual and social dis-
counting behaviour is likely to depend on a number of
other factors, such as local ecological conditions and
environmental variability; an organism’s age; whether or
not the population of the local community is growing;
social structure within a community; and the spatial and
network structure of communities. The last of these factors
raises the possibility of several social discount rates
corresponding to different levels of community organization
within certain forms of population structure. Detailed
representation of these considerations will require more
complex models. However, it is likely that the insights
contained in the simple model presented here will carry
over to models of greater complexity.This work was supported by the London School of
Economics. I thank three anonymous reviewers for
comments and suggestions.REFERENCES
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I will restrict consideration to a diploid population in which individuals are either male or female. I 
show that, if the sex ratio of each patch is maintained at exactly 1:1, and the two sexes are 
symmetric (i.e. they have the same death rates and the sex ratio at birth is 1:1), the results for the 
asexual model described in the main text will continue to hold exactly. I go on to explain why they 
will not, in general, hold exactly if the sex ratio in a patch can drift away from 1:1, but they will 
become a progressively more accurate approximation to optimal behaviour as the number of 
members N for each patch increases. 
 
Sex ratio fixed at 1:1 
Relatedness calculations apply to autosomal genes. The population is again defined by the 
parameters N, k, v and ω. The patch destruction and colonisation rate ω has the same meaning as 
before. Suppose that the number of individuals N in each patch is an even number and the sex ratio 
is maintained at 1:1, so that an individual reproduction and mortality event involves either a female 
replacing a female or a male replacing a male. Then each patch always has N/2 females and N/2 
males. The probability per unit time for an individual to be killed in an individual replacement event 
is as before k, having the same value for both females and males, whilst the probability per unit time 
for becoming the parent of a newborn is 2k. These assumptions lead to the same individual and 
patch survival functions as for the asexual case (expressions 2.1 and 2.2 in the main text). The 
dispersal level is v, as in the asexual model,. It will be assumed that dispersal occurs after 
fertilisation, i.e. it is zygotes or young individuals which disperse, not gametes. As in the asexual 
model, R will denote the mean relatedness of an individual to other members of its patch including 
itself, and ROTH will denote the mean relatedness of an individual to other members of its patch 
excluding itself. 
Consider a new member of the focal organism’s patch. As for the asexual case, there is a 
probability (1- v) that its parents are from the home patch. Given that the parents are from the home 
patch, there is a probability 2/N that the focal organism is one of its parents, resulting in a 
relatedness of (1 + ROTH)/2 to the newborn, and a probability (1 – 2/N) that the focal organism is not 
a parent of the newborn, resulting in a relatedness ROTH. This yields the recurrence relationship 
ROTH = (1- v)[(2/N)(1 + ROTH)/2 + (1 - 2/N)ROTH] 
which is the same as (2.4) in the main text. Hence relatedness is the same as for the asexual case 
(2.4 and 2.5 in the main text).. 
In considering fitness values of different benefits, for this sexual population a reproductive 
benefit a to the focal organism itself means an amount of reproduction equivalent to producing a 
diploid copies of itself, and hence 2a offspring to which it is one parent (with the other parent being 
one of the other members of the patch). With respect to expected gene frequencies, this is 
equivalent to asexual reproductive output of a by the focal organism plus asexual reproductive 
output of a by a random other member of the patch. But the net effect on the focal organism’s 
fitness of additional reproductive output by another member of the patch is zero, as discussed in 
section 4(c). It follows that the fitness effect of becoming a sexual parent to an expected additional 
2a offspring is equivalent to additional asexual output of a, and therefore (4.1) will continue to 
hold. 
Now consider additional reproductive output equivalent to b diploid young, where the 
parents are chosen at random from all members of the patch including the focal organism. Then the 
fitness benefit is the expected proportion of this output which disperses, multiplied by the 
relatedness to the focal organism, so that (4.2) again holds. As both (4.1) and (4.2) continue to hold 
for the sexual case, and relatedness is unchanged (2.4 and 2.5), it follows that (4.3) will again hold. 
For an immediate colonisation benefit, expression (4.4) holds again, using exactly the same 
argument as in section 4(d) of the main text. A delayed reproductive benefit to the focal organism 
will be discounted, as in the main text, according to the individual survival function si(τ), and as 
si(τ) is the same as for the asexual model, the individual discount rate is again given by (4.7). 
Relatedness on the patch to the focal organism decays, as in the asexual case, due to 
dispersal and the risk of patch destruction. The arguments of section 4(g) are unchanged, giving 
expression (4.8) as before for relatedness RE(τ) of the focal organism to the patch conditional on the 
patch not having suffered catastrophic destruction during the delay but not conditional on the focal 
organism remaining alive. Similarly, expressions (4.9) and (4.10) for unconditional relatedness 
RU(τ) of the focal organism to the patch remain the same. The arguments of section 4(h) and 4(i) for 
the fitness value of delayed benefits to the patch remain as before, yielding the same social discount 
rate (4.13) as for the asexual case. 
 
Turning to the case of enforced collective social action, all the expressions in section 4(k) 
apply again to the sexual case, resulting in the same social discount rate (4.18) under enforced 
collective social action. 
 
Sex ratio allowed to drift 
Assume now that the sex ratio is no longer fixed at 1:1 but is allowed to drift. The most 
parsimonious population process under which this will happen is that all members of a patch have 
an equal probability of death in a replacement event, with the newborn having a 50% chance of 
being female and a 50% chance of being male, regardless of the current sex ratio in the patch. A 
detailed analysis of the resulting dynamics and fitness-maximising preferences depends on 
additional assumptions, such as: how does the mean per-capita reproduction rate depend on the sex 
ratio? And: can an organism condition its preferences (and hence its behaviour in binary choice 
problems) according to the current sex ratio? Whatever detailed assumptions are made, however, if 
the sex ratio is allowed to drift then there will be a finite proportion of patches in which all the 
individuals are of the same sex. In a same sex patch, a newborn must have dispersed in from 
another patch, whatever the nominal value of v for the population. But there is a probability of 0.5 
that the newborn will be of the same sex as the other patch members, in which case the next 
newborn must also disperse in from another patch. This indicates that, for the population as a 
whole, there will be a statistical correlation in the probability that successive newborns in a patch 
have dispersed in from other patches. But the recurrence relationship for relatedness (expression 
2.4) is based on the assumption that there is a constant (independent) probability v that each 
newborn in a patch is dispersed in from outside, regardless of the origins of the previous newborn. 
This assumption also underpins the exponential decay of relatedness RE(τ) and RU(τ) to the focal 
organism with delay (expressions 4.8 and 4.9). It follows that (4.9) will no longer hold exactly, 
meaning that the expression for the social discount rate (4.13) is no longer valid. 
However, random drift in the sex ratio on a patch will be less important as N increases. If the 
possible dependence of changes in the probability per unit time for individual replacement events 
on the sex ratio is ignored, then the number of females on a patch of size N will follow an 
approximately binomial distribution of the form B(N, 0.5), so that the standard deviation in the 
proportion of females in a patch becomes smaller as N becomes larger. That is, as N increases 
optimal behaviour will approximate progressively closely to the results for the asexual population. 
 
 
